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Furrow and Hyman: Federal Efforts and State Approaches to the Crisis

SESSION

1: FEDERAL EFFORTS AND STATE APPROACHES TO THE CRISIS

DR. HYMAN: It's a real pleasure to be here. Barry Furrow is a giant of
the health law field. He is currently the Director of the Health Law Institute
and Professor of Law at Widener University School of Law. Barry has
been in this business for quite a while. He has written a vast array of
articles. He is the lead author on the single best selling textbook of health
law. [He] has a whole series of other textbooks. Just to give you a sense of
Barry's significance in the field, he received the highest award from the
American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics for a law teacher, the Jay
Healey Award, in 1995, and he is still at it. You only get that after a
lifetime of achievement.
Barry has a lot of slides and we have a lot of ground to cover. So just to
give you a sense of what the framework is for the rest of this morning,
Barry is going to talk, I am going to make some brief remarks thereafter,
and then we will open it up to questions. So, with no further adieu,
Professor Barry Furrow.
PROF. FURROW: Thank you, David. It's a pleasure to be introduced by
David. David, since he went into law teaching, has been a fearsome scholar
and commentator on other people's work and has offered incredible insights
in every area he has written. So, I'm looking forward to seeing his
reactions to my talk as well.
You must understand I am an academic, which means, as I said to
someone before the session started, academics know a small amount about
a whole lot of things, but we don't normally bore down as deep as an
insurance actuary does. We don't always understand in the trenches how
something feels, but we look at the studies. We have a global perspective
that's gleaned from reading a whole lot of stuff all the time. So, that's the
best I can offer you, my sense of this crisis.
I started in academia in 1974. In the summer of 1974, I worked at the
University of Maryland with Ken Abraham putting together a malpractice
conference to follow up on the 1973 Department of Health Education and
Welfare (HEW) report on the malpractice crisis of 1972. So, it keeps going
around.
In some sense, there is nothing really new here. In some sense, there are
some new forces at work. You have to sort out, for purposes of what you
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want to do, what these different issues are.
So, let me take you to the graph that says it all: "Net Profit or Loss as a
Percentage of Net Worth for Medical Malpractice Insurance Companies."'
A downward sloping line is a bad thing. Any economist would tell you
that. Insurance companies are bleeding money. That's a description of a
malpractice insurance crisis. You are not making money on a line of
insurance, in this case, a malpractice line. So, that's the way to frame the
issues. That's the image to keep in mind, a line dropping precipitously.
That's why there is a crisis.
I want to round up the usual suspects for you and these are caricatures, so
anybody in one of these groups, feel free to take offense. I will try to
smooth it out later.
Possible suspects in the malpractice crisis are the patient-consumer, the
trial lawyers, the American Medical Association (AMA), national politics,
the physicians, the health systems, and finally, the insurers. These are the
seven groups I would look at either as fuel for the crisis, pouring gasoline
on the crisis, or as a piece of the crisis that you have to peel apart.
The patient-consumer, Bruce Willis on steroids. The patient from hell.
He is even-armed, cranky, hyper-vigilant, demanding, intolerant of error.
This is, I think, the AMA's view of the litigious patient. I will talk more
about this later, but my response is that in fact, there aren't really very many
suits brought out of the universe of possible claims. Consumers are
remarkably forgiving of error in the doctor's office, but there are more
doctors than there are errors, so the curve still keeps going up.
We know from the 1984 Harvard Medical Practice Study that the tort
system undercompensates victims of negligence.2 So, for every Bruce
Willis, there are a dozen patients who don't do anything. The overlap area
[see chart] represents actual victims of negligence who file a claim. That
means more people sue than have a legitimate claim, as measured by some
standard of care test and there are lots of victims who never do anything, for
a variety of reasons-some of the claims are too small [or] lawyers won't
take them.
The next slide shows the relationship between injuries and claims.4 This
slide I owe to Michelle Mello, who presented at another conference I saw.
1. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO), PUB. No. GAO-03-702, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: MULTIPLE FACTORS HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED
PREMIUM

RATES 29 (June 2003), availableat http://www.gao.gov.

2. Troy A. Brennan et al., Incidence of Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized
Patients: Results of the HarvardMedical PracticeStudy 1, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 6, 370-76
(1991).
3. See App. A, Graph: The Tort System Undercompensates Victims of Negligence.
4. See App. B, Graph: Relationship Between Injuries & Claims.
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It's striking. What it tells you is essentially that about one out of fifty
potentially valid true negligent claims are ever brought and forty-nine are
not [brought]. So, out of all the hospitalizations, three to four percent result
in injuries, and one percent might be attributed to substandard care, as
measured by physician peer reviewers. Of the valid potential claims, two
percent end up in actual claims. And then [the chart indicates] the frivolous
versus valid claims. "Frivolous" is a term of art to mean you can't prove it.
It doesn't mean "frivolous" [in the true sense of the word]. Lawyers don't
bring frivolous claims very often. It's too expensive. You end up with
fifty-percent of the claims that are brought being paid.
It's not a pretty picture of the tort system. The tort system is not
particularly a hero in this crisis. It doesn't do very well as a compensation
system, but it also, in some ways, isn't the fall guy that it's often painted to
be.
Are there increases in malpractice litigation? Is that driving the prices?
There is little evidence of a rapid and sudden increase in the frequency and
severity of judgments over the last few years. But, there has been a steady
increase in severity of judgments starting with baseline effects of medical
healthcare cost inflation and then adding on other effects.
The data isn't very good and one of the running comments I will have
throughout my talk is [that] the data isn't very good. It would be nice to
have better data about the insurance industry, about practice patterns, about
errors in doctors' offices. There is a lot of research that needs to be done
and a lot of data that needs to be disclosed. Some of that has to be
disclosed under compulsion. I think where David and I may disagree
sometimes is that I am a terrific fan of regulation. I like the market too, but
regulation has its place.
The second suspects are the trial lawyers, Dickie Scruggs on the
rampage. Dickie Scruggs, of course, brought the tobacco litigation. He led
the litigation against Aetna and managed care companies on behalf of both
consumers, which got dismissed, and doctors, which is now being settled.
So, he should be a hero of doctors, but he, in my mind, is an example of a
ferocious plaintiffs attorney. This is a lawyer abusing a failed tort system,
penalizing doctors at random, generating frivolous lawsuits, and
overcompensating undeserving plaintiffs. It's a vision of tort lawyers gone
mad based on hopelessly flawed assumptions painted by political pundits
who have a political ax to grind.
My response, and we already saw a little piece of this, is that the tort
system under-compensates. Its deterrent effect may be real, but it's very
hard to prove it. It does have some effect on limiting access in some
markets, but it's not as bad as you think, according to the General
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Accounting Office (GAO) report5 and in fact, these are tough cases to bring
from a lawyer's point of view. I have trained a lot of plaintiffs lawyers.
These are not easy cases to file. They are not easy cases to bring. They are
very expensive and insurers and doctors fight very, very hard. So, don't
worry about Dickie Scruggs.
The third suspect is the AMA. The current president of the AMA is not
only an M.D., but [also] a J.D. The AMA has got every medical society
whining about caps as being the ultimate solution. [T]hey have evolved
from a 1985 proposal of a very sophisticated kind of worker's
compensation-style administrative law system, which would have been
expensive, but would have compensated many small claims. It would have
solved some of the problems the tort system doesn't solve. [Currently, the
AMA] has dummied its proposal down to copying MICRA, the California
$250,000 cap, without adjustments for inflation. Shame on them. The
AMA knows better, but it's about all they can sell that's easy to explain.
That's one of the problems with this crisis. It's hard to explain. It has so
many facets to it.
The fourth suspect is national politics. Let's pour some gasoline on the
controversy. Karl Rove, the neutralizer, George Bush's mastermind. There
is no doubt there is an opportunity to declare a war on the trial lawyers.
They fund a lot of the Democratic campaigns. Let's cut back their ability to
litigate by whittling back on the tort system. Karl Rove certainly has talked
about this. Let us not worry about him too much-this has rarely been a
national question.
The fifth suspect is the physician, Dr. Prima Donna. This is a footstomping angry physician with no patience, little understanding of the
system, and no awareness of the consequences of tort reform. But, it is
indeed true that there is reason to weep in some specialties and in some
areas for very particular reasons. [For example,] I come from Pennsylvania
and there is a lot of gnashing of teeth in Pennsylvania.
The doctors have several complaints. First, they are forced into defensive
medical practices that are unproductive as an overreaction to liability.
Evidence is equivocal at best. The strongest influence on physicians is
clinical information and how it's processed. I might add reimbursement is
another important piece of that. [While] the evidence is that they [the
doctors] react in terms of tort fears, the studies don't support it as the
driving force.
Second, they [complain that they] spend too much on insurance. Well,
compared to what? For most doctors, premiums have been too low for over
a decade, artificially priced under what the market and an actuary would say
5. GAO, supra note 1.
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol13/iss2/9
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is appropriate. Now, you get an accelerating catch-up phenomenon in
premium pricing. You haven't planned for it, but in some sense, it's
predictable. Of course, if physicians were great investors, they wouldn't be
physicians anymore because they would be rich. But they are not great
investors. We know that from reading Medical Economics. They get
burned all the time and it's hard to plan for this one.
Third, physicians worry a lot about litigation. Physicians are obsessed
with trial lawyers. They worry far beyond their risk of being sued.
The sixth suspect is health systems, "St. latrogenesis Hospital."
Are more medical
latrogenesis is provider-induced patient injury.
system is a
healthcare
The
are.
they
misadventures occurring? Of course
legitimate culprit. The Institute of Medicine (IOM) report, in effect,
100,0006
fingered the healthcare system, projecting up to approximately studies.
New York
1994
the
on
based
setting,
hospital
a
in
year
deaths a
The unhappy part of the picture is the patient safety medical error piece of
the malpractice insurance crisis. Medicine is dangerous-much more
dangerous than it used to be because it can do a lot more than it used to and
it uses high-powered drugs and complicated procedures done to sicker and
older patients.
Healthcare is a very chaotic and poorly managed environment, in my
judgment, in many institutions. [It is] complex, interactive and hasn't been
subjected to the kind of thoughtful system reforms that you would expect
for a system that cares for human beings. System failures account for most
errors in hospitals. One study traced eighty percent of hospital adverse drug
events to system malfunctions such as staffing shortcomings or actual
physical design limitations in the surgical suite. These are simple things
that a practitioner of feng shui would come in and fix. Where are the
drugs? Where are the labels? How easy is it to get confused?
Adverse drug events account for about ten percent of all hospitalizations
and the most recent study in the Archives of Surgery from just two weeks
ago shows that the office setting has a ten-fold increased risk of adverse
7
events or death compared to the hospital. [I]f you think the hospital is
scary, watch out for the doctor's office. If doctors are going to do any
surgical procedure, do they have a properly trained nurse anesthetist? Do
they know what they are doing? Do they have infection control? No, no,
and no, except in New Jersey, which is highly regulated in terms of the
office setting. There is a lot of danger out there for patients and there are

6.

INST. OF MED.

(1OM), To

ERR is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM

26

(2000).
7. Hector Vila et al., Comparative Outcomes Analysis of Procedures Performed in
Physician Offices and Ambulatory Surgery Centers, 138 ARCH. SURG. 991 (2003).
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too many incompetent doctors in the system and they are not properly
disciplined by state medical boards. They don't pay much attention to this.
I did an online survey using the public citizen database of various states
and disciplines. I discovered that if you look at a state and you see 3000
disciplinary actions against doctors and then you burrow in a little bit, you
discover that a large number of them involve failures to satisfy Continuing
Medical Education (CME) requirements. It's trivial regulation at some
level. They don't really go after serious quality problems in many of the
states because of funding and other limitations.
If there are incompetent doctors, are they reported by hospitals? Are
they reported by managed care plans that have the ability to track and see
the outliers? No. The last Inspector General reported [that] eighty-four
percent of HMOs and sixty percent of hospitals never reported a single
adverse event to the national physician database.8 Additionally, from 1990
to 1999, HMOs reported 715 adverse actions, which is pathetic for a
country with almost 800,000 doctors. [W]e are not doing a very good job.
The seventh suspect, and my last and final player, is Ralph Actuary in
heat. A rapacious industry, stocking up on easy premium dollars to invest
and luring innocent doctors with seductively low premiums. Insurance is
an engine for making money. Malpractice insurance is a subset of an
insurance market that is a very competitive market with economic behavior
that can lead to what you find in a free marketplace. Insurers are going out
of business, fighting like crazy to achieve market share, and it's the
doctors, who are the insureds, and they suffer the consequences of
premium swings. So, the insurance industry is in some ways a paradigm of
a free market and operation. Rapacious? Not particularly-it's a market.
[L]et's talk about the insurance crisis. It's created by rapid, unexpected
premium increases. It's sticker shock. It has an uneven, unexpected effect
on revenue in an era when physicians simply can't pass along these added
costs to the insurers or the patients. The system is much more constrained
than it was in 1985 during the second malpractice crisis or in 1972 or 197374 during the first.. We have had three crises. [The system is] more
constrained by managed care and by federal reimbursement policy. Doctors
are really stuck between insurance pressures and rigidities in
reimbursement. They can't pass their costs on. They have reasons to
scream.
I am going to tell you things you already know better than I do, many of
you at the table. How do you set premiums? You have ratemaking, based
on actuaries and their attempts to predict, you have market characteristics,
8. Robert Pear, Incompetent PhysiciansAre Rarely Listed as Law Requires, availableat
http://www.forensic-psych.com/articies/artcompetentphy.html.
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and you have investment earnings.They [the actuaries] really worry about
money.
The first factor [in setting premiums] is ratemaking-the science or the
art of predicting future claims and expenses based on past experience. You
look at the expected severity of judgments and the expected frequency of
claims and you have to decide on the mean [judgment and] the largest
judgment. And the largest judgments are what terrifies the actuary because
what's the consequence of a $50 million settlement or jury verdict on a
small insurance company? [Also], you have frequency of claims. Is there
an increase in filings? Is there an expected increase in filings? Will
settlements increase? What are the dynamics of the legal system? That is
part of the actuary's job in predicting insurance.
Insurance is based on the law of large numbers. The problem is small
numbers. Auto insurance is the paradigm case-hundreds of thousands of
policies. You can smooth everything out and write a policy and predict
pretty accurately your exposure. However, malpractice is a problem of a
small pool with some states having a lot of the losses. There is a lot of
variation regionally within states. There simply aren't large numbers, and
the awards vary tremendously, with fifty percent of the dollars paid out on
three percent of the claims. [Therefore], a single claim has a catastrophic
effect on a small area.
[Further], there is a lack of independence in claims against the doctor. A
few doctors are typically responsible for a bulk of the claims for one reason
Because of that lack of
or another, which is not always clear.
lawyers can learn from
accidents,
auto
independence, unlike with
experience. They can learn from looking at providers. There are providers
in Philadelphia that are probably named right now in fifty ongoing cases.
They do a lot of surgery. Lawyers talk to each other. They learn.
Also, there are changing circumstances. Medical cost inflation is
normally much higher than the growth in the gross domestic product in the
normal inflation rate. Payouts have risen, in part, in sync with medical
inflation. There is debate about this. We have a data issue here. The
consumer group, Americans for Insurance Reform (AIR), says [that]
9
medical cost inflation explains everything about the malpractice crisis.
That's not true in Pennsylvania, that's not true in Florida, that's not true in
the problem states. It may be true in South Dakota, which is a great place
to be a doctor if you don't want to worry about your premiums, but it's not
true in the big urbanized states.
There has been an expansion in legal doctrine and I think probably Nina
9. AMS. FOR INS. REFORM
LOSSES/UNSTABLE RATES 4 (2002).
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[Appel, Dean of Loyola University Chicago School of Law], David
[Hyman], and I will take some responsibility for this. We are professors
and we push the envelope. The casebooks are full of the cutting edge cases.
A case has one decision that develops a new doctrine and we spread it, and
the courts also pay attention, and our students try to use it. Loss of a chance
is a good example of this. Can you sue a doctor for a misdiagnosis that
increases the patient's risk of dying from thirteen to twenty-five percent?
The chance is lost, an opportunity was missed to diagnose. Some states
have adopted the loss of a chance doctrine. That's an exposure that didn't
exist twenty years ago because that doctrine didn't exist. More cases can be
brought and more is being done-more diagnosis and treatment of diseases
we couldn't treat before. You miss a diagnosis and the patient loses that
opportunity, even if he was going to die anyway. That's compensable.
Also, we have sharpened the rules of evidence. The standard of care is
more accessible. Thousands of new studies are pouring out every day and
the standard of care starts to crystallize in some disciplines. The medical
society is crystallizing it. They develop evidence-based medicine and the
result is [that] the lawyers notice. They use specialty standards and they
read the research. They do their homework and it makes the settlement
value of these cases go up. That, of course, has an insurance consequence.
Finally, social attitudes are changing. Not every patient is becoming
Bruce Willis. They are more informed. They are more aware of medical
errors and system failures. There is no doubt that they are more sensitive to
risk than they used to be and that they do pay attention.
The second factor driving premium rates is insurance market
characteristics. How many doctors are there? What's the distribution
among specialties? What kind of competition is there from other insurers?
Is there a cap fund or some kind of state fund that allows physicians
protection from excess losses because that helps to smooth out the market a
little bit?
The third factor is investment earnings. We have a lumpy underwriting
cycle here. There is a problem because what insurers do is collect premium
dollars and invest them in the bond market, primarily, and also in the stock
market. Some smaller carriers invest it more in the stock market; it depends
on state regulation and what the restrictions are on their investment. It looks
like they [the insurance carriers] are no smarter than the rest of us-they
didn't get out in time and their reserves took a hit. You can lose money
selling insurance as long as you are collecting the money and investing it.
It doesn't matter, as long as your aggregate income is held up by your
investment earnings.
Past malpractice crises were driven by precipitous drops in the rate of
return. We knew that. It's [the rate of return] gone down even more today.
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol13/iss2/9
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The average return on investment in 1997 was 5.6%, [in] 2002, [it was]
4.0%. 1° Today I am not sure what it would be-2%, 2.3%? The bad news
is the drop in your return on an investment of 1% leads to a 4% increase in
premiums and a 2% drop leads to an 8% increase in premiums. You can do
the math. This is where it starts.
Thus, premiums have to be raised to recapture the loss on investment rate
of return. What happens? Some carriers can't keep it up and they drop out
of the market. Those who remain can be predatory and can raise premiums
quickly. The GAO study suggests that, for the most part, the increases are
quite predictable, and legitimate increases mask the losses." However, the
result is sticker shock.
Here you have a graph that's income as a percentage of premiums
collected.' 2 In 1975, there is a low point; in 1983-85, there are low points.
There is a dip in 1992 and then the graph just keeps going. The graph
doesn't extend with data, but if you kept going it would be below zero and
dropping in 2003. That tells you that you are not doing very well. Why do
we have this insurance cycle? The stock and bond markets dropped and
this particular graph tracks that very nicely and explains some of the
insurance premium pricing problems.
We have cash flow underwriting and once the premiums reach
actuarially sound levels, profits start to rise. This is a market in general
where it doesn't take much to enter it. I had a meeting with the Delaware
Commissioner of Insurance and a new company that came into Delaware.
They [the company] saw this as an opportunity because everybody else had
dropped out [of the market], either because they went bankrupt or in St.
Paul's case, because they quit. They were coming in to offer lower rates;
they were competitive. And so, the cycle begins again. It doesn't have a
lot to do with frequency or severity of claims. You get low-ball pricing
with low-barrier entry. Doctors are notoriously promiscuous in shopping
for insurance. They don't have any loyalty. The next company comes
along with a lower premium and they jump. That's a problem for insurers
that are trying to offer an office management/risk management package,
offering stability in pricing.
In Pennsylvania, one law firm has been working to develop an insurance
exchange product-a new entry in the malpractice insurance market in
Pennsylvania, now Florida, and I gather they are thinking about Illinois.
The risk management piece of the product, auditing doctors' offices, is a
major part of what they do and they think doctors will remain loyal because
10.
11.
12.

GAO, supra note 1, at 25.
Id.
AIR, supra note 9, at 3.
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the promise is that their premiums won't have these jumps. They may be a
little higher to start, but they will be stable and predictable. Well, it remains
to be seen.
As a response to the market, insurers raise premiums. They also drop
lines of insurance that are hard to predict and malpractice is one of the
worst. They [also] drop out of the market altogether. St. Paul's has
dropped out and it was at one point the biggest carrier nationally. [The
result of all this] is medical distress. It hurts. You get doctors who are now
over-anxious as a result and they indeed have an issue.
My summary of the insurance universe is that the current malpractice
crisis, like the previous two, is fueled by this investment insurance cycle; by
healthcare cost inflation, which is ramping up as more and more is donehealthcare is becoming a big driver of our economy; and there are increased
levels of medical errors. There is no doubt about it. We have a problem for
some providers, in some parts of the country in particular.
I will give you a few data bytes. The data is not always totally
trustworthy and some of these are extracted from older studies of the
previous crisis, but they are interesting. They are worthy of further
confirmation.
Premiums are higher when a population's exposure to iatrogenic injuries
increases. More surgery leads to higher premiums because there is more
risk. It's a "risk" business that insurers are in. Also, when there are more
doctors, premiums drops. Higher real income increases premiums. That's
no surprise. If you make your money, your wages are higher, your losses
are higher, you are a better plaintiff and more attractive for plaintiff's
lawyers to bring the lawsuit.
Additionally, the percentage of population over sixty-five is correlated to
premiums. If you want to be a doctor, you are probably better off in Iowa,
the state with the highest percentage of over sixty-five population. They are
Midwestern, they are sweet, they are not litigious, and they are old. They
are not worth as much. They don't work anymore. Now, everybody works
all the time. Iowa, Nebraska, South Dakota, Minnesota-those are the good
news states.
[Furthermore], more lawyers doesn't mean higher premiums or higher
claim severity because these cases are hard to bring. There is no evidence
that pumping more graduates out of law schools makes a big difference.
Finally, premium regulation based on prior approval by the state
insurance regulators is associated with lower premiums. That's the problem
with the California MICRA caps model-it's a paradigm for malpractice
reform. California has fairly intense regulation of insurers. Many states do
not. Most states, Minnesota and Missouri, for example, let the market work
its way out, which is fine in most lines of insurance. [However], in
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol13/iss2/9
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malpractice, it has a premium sticker shock problem for the insurers. So,
great regulation isn't a bad thing if you want to solve a crisis.
David [Hyman] is going to talk about some of the fixes that I am not
spending much time on. I will just run through a number of ideas that have
been discussed. Some are happening, some are hypothetical.
The government is funding demonstration projects now, in terms of some
malpractice reform items. The Healthcare Offer and Recovery Model,
which was something that Jeff O'Connell developed in the 1970s, and was
subsequently proposed in 1985 in legislation. It never [went] anywhere, but
it's resurfaced now in the latest Institute of Medicine report.
Further, we can enforce quality more effectively. I can tell you that in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the U.S. Attorney is using the False
Claims Act savagely to go after providers for poor quality, not for cost
issues. He is looking at long-term care [facilities], academic medical
centers, and hospitals. He is going to federalize healthcare quality using the
False Claims Act. Secondly, there is a new rule from the Center for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) on medical error, which tells
hospitals they have to develop error disclosure and an error management
system.1 3 It piggybacks on the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) rule. 14 It's a wimpy regulatory prep.
CMS is a very wimpy regulator, in my opinion. They don't like to do it.
They are piggybacking, but it has potential if you can lose your Medicare
status if you don't put into place a good program.
A third potential solution is tort reform. I would say [to] leave it to the
states. It is a state problem and it's a very particular state problem in parts
of the state only. In Pennsylvania, it's Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. It's a
very localized issue best dealt with by the states.
Fourth, pay for performance. Medicare is experimenting with this
concept-the idea of reducing error by ratcheting up quality. It's not a bad
one. The Blues, Aetna, and U.S. Healthcare have worked on this for years.
I just talked to somebody at Blue Cross in New Jersey; they are beginning
to develop a tiered bonus system for their physicians. They try to actively
promote quality by paying higher rates for doctors who meet certain
benchmarks. Clearly, that's going to keep developing.
As for state reforms, if you are going to reform the tort system, I would
suggest the Missouri model. Pain and suffering, non-economic loss, is a
variable for an actuary. They lose sleep over it because it's hard to predict.
13. Quality Assessment and Performance Improvement, 68 Fed. Reg. 3435 (Jan. 24,
2003) (codified as 42 C.F.R. 482).
14. See Joint Comm'n on Accreditation of Healthcare Orgs., Reporting of
Medical/Health Care Errors, at http://www.jcaho.org/accredited+organizations/
patient+safety/medical+errors+disclosure/index.htm.
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Lawyers know it's not that hard to predict. Over a lot of cases you can
roughly benchmark what it's going to be. I would say if you are going to
have caps, adjust them for inflation. Start at $500,000, which is about what
Missouri is at, and let them ride along with inflation. That's fair to
plaintiffs, at least.
The problem is that the Indiana studies suggest that you have to be
careful what you wish for because Indiana put caps into place and it
appeared to change litigation and settlement practices and judgments went
up. 15 It may have a perverse effect on lawyer-provider settlement practices
and lawyer incentives.
Also, I suggest mediation to help price the value of a claim. Some states
have mediation where, in effect, a panel prices the case. You can settle. If
you don't settle, you go to trial and if you don't get ten percent more than
the mediation price, you have to pay the other side's attorney's fees. Some
counties in Michigan have this and it really hurts. It makes you pay
attention and price the case properly.
I am not going to go into arbitration. I think arbitration is a mistake for a
number of reasons I don't have time to talk about.
There are other models-stabilize the insurance market. Joint
underwriting associations, which some states have and some don't, [can be
used] to cover the distressed specialties that really have problems just to
ride out the cycle. It's a taxpayer or a specific tax-generated fund to help
deal with sticker shock, get the specialties out of danger, and make sure
there is coverage available. [Another possibility is] intensified regulation of
insurers [including] a mandated risk data provision, rate regulation, and
notice of renewals [that allow] enough time for the doctors to react and seek
another policy.
An additional state reform is mandated error disclosures. This is
something Pennsylvania started in the last two years. Pennsylvania has the
new Patient Safety Authority which requires hospitals to disclose near
misses and medical errors. 16 It has whistleblower protection. It ties into the
Department of Insurance's regulations and there are substantial penalties for
noncompliance. We will see if they mean business. But, it's a particular
kind of regulatory model that isn't the JCAHO kind of mild accreditation
approach, although that can hurt too. Here, there are penalties and they are
actively soliciting whistleblowers to turn in their institutions. We'll see
how this plays out. It was based on the Surgeon General of Pennsylvania's

15. William P. Gronfein & Eleanor D. Kinney, ControllingLarge Malpractice Claims:
The Unexpected Impact of Damage Caps, 16 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 441 (1991).
16.

See Pa. Patient Safety Auth., Reporting Medical Errors, available at http://

www.psa.state.pa.us.
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experience with the Veteran's Administration (VA) system; he was very
impressed by the new VA, with all of its error management strategies.
The fourth state reform strategy is to refocus medical discipline and
regulatory efforts. Pay more attention to the office, where it turns out lots
of bad things are happening. Think about regulation of office practice [and]
office surgery as a piece of improving the medical discipline.
[Regarding] private efforts, there are provider strategies. Some hospitals
here may be doing it. It turns out [that] the Hickson study found that at
Vanderbilt University Medical Center, the doctors who were getting sued
had bad personalities. 17 They were litigation prone. A good psychologist
could pick it right out. Vanderbilt launched a program to retrain their
litigation-prone doctors. They may not be error-generating doctors, but
patients hate them and if something goes wrong, they want to sue them. It's
a personality question of sorts. It manages some risks and eliminates them.
Secondly, do hospitals have governing board policies that allow
Medical staffs normally
summary suspension of problem doctors?
dominate hospitals. This empowers the board, under the bylaws, to deal
with bad actors swiftly. I have an Illinois case for you, which some of you
probably litigated and know more about, but I thought the court's language
was hard and interesting in the case.1 8 Lastly, better integrated patient
safety is [another] provider strategy, which I think David will talk to you
about.
[There are patient strategies as well, such as] better search[es] for
quality. I asked my healthcare regulation class about this (they are nurses,
doctors, lawyers)-how many of them have searched systematically online
for quality. Many of them had when they needed something done because
Pennsylvania has the Health Care Cost Containment Council (PHC4),
which generates mortality/morbidity figures on all of Pennsylvania's
hospitals. You can shop until you drop and you can pick what you want for
what procedure you need. The data is often problematic and limited, but
it's still helpful. Patients can also demand proof of efficacy.
Another [patient] strategy is more tort litigation. It's ironic [because]
doctors want more tort litigation, [but] only against managed care. The
system works great if you are suing managed care. It doesn't work at all if
you are suing the doctors. That's a tension that one has to sort out. I would
tend to move tort litigation, as I would payment systems, toward systems,
integrating systems, insuring systems, suing systems, trying to get the
doctors a little bit off the hook, and worry about error reduction through
17. See Gerald B. Hickson et al., Patient Complaints and MalpracticeRisk, 287 JAMA
2951 (2002).
18. Lo v. Provena Covenant Med. Ctr., 796 N.E.2d 607, 614 (2003).
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other strategies.
Buyers [also have strategies]. I mentioned New Jersey Blue Cross'
strategies of tiered payment systems paying for quality. Can you do risk
rating? Can you, as a part of your premium pricing, actively try to manage
groups and have rates reflect risk? With small numbers, that is more
difficult to do, admittedly.
[What are the] prospects for crisis relief? I call it waiting on Greenspan.
We are waiting for him to see what happens with interest rates. Has the
bond market improved? If it does, the insurance market will inevitably
rebound. Profitability will increase. Investment income will become good
news instead of bad news and premiums, well, they will never drop back to
basis. Every cycle moves the basis up, but they will drop back and it will
appear [that] the crisis is over. Better insurance regulation and better
products may smooth out some of this. Pressures from buyers in the
government will move us toward lower levels of errors, one hopes. Then
you can manage litigation and look at high-risk providers.
I left patient education. It will have good effects if it's properly done. It
seems to me worker's compensation systems have learned to manage
premiums to some extent by much more intrusive and intensive workplace
safety programs. As a result, some worker's compensation systems have
stabilized their premiums.
Healthcare is much more complicated, admittedly, in some ways.
Nonetheless, it seems to me [that] a real patient safety movement, an
institutional safety movement, as the prospect, with these other reforms
may be holding us back from yet another malpractice crisis in thirteen to
fifteen years. I'm sure I will still be writing and lawyering then and we will
be talking about it again if it happens. Thank you very much.
DR. HYMAN: Thank you, Barry. A couple of preliminary remarks. I'm
actually spending half of my time at the Federal Trade Commission, and so
I am required to say that nothing I will say should be imputed to any
member of the Federal Trade Commission or the Commission itself. That's
not because the Federal Trade Commission has done anything in particular
on medical malpractice for complex statutory and jurisdictional reasons,
that's primarily the ambit of the States and the Department of Justice, but
I'm just required to make that disclosure.
I am going to talk briefly really where Barry left off, which is the patient
safety side of this. The focus, I think earlier, was certainly significantly
more on the insurance side of this and I think it's important not to lose site
of the fact that we have medical malpractice litigation in response to
medical malpractice, i.e., problems with quality.
There is [a] lot of debate about how effectively medical malpractice
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol13/iss2/9
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litigation deals with the problem of medical malpractice. The data issue is
certainly an important one to keep in mind, but the title really is there is [a]
lot of blame to go around, so let me just go directly to it.
The empirical literature on quality is pretty scary. They are not tabloid
headlines. The Institute of Medicine report identified that medical error is
the eighth leading cause of death in the United States, ranking ahead of
breast cancer, motor vehicle accidents, and AIDS. 19 That's just in the
hospital. That's not deaths out of the hospital. That's not injuries in the
hospital or out of the hospital that don't result in death. This is a very
significant issue economically and most of the costs are borne by patients
and their families.
There is a lot of literature on quality. I am going to focus on a recent
article in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), which
looked at all of the states using twenty-two process base measures in
Medicare fee-for-service for six different medical conditions. The
benchmark quality goal for all twenty-two of the measures was 100%.
Everybody should have gotten all the things they identified. The median
performance was 73%. That's a C. It's a C in areas where patients lives are
at stake. There are a lot of variants within states and within measures. The
actual performance at its lowest was about 11%. For some measures,
though, they actually clocked in at 100%.
If you look at this data, you could have two hypotheses. One hypothesis
is the worse your quality, the more medical discipline you should have in
response to it. If you had that, the line would start at the origin and go
upward and to the right. An alternative hypothesis is if you really
aggressively go after problems and you have a high medical discipline rate,
you should have better quality in response to that. Then it would start in the
upper left-hand comer and go down. If you look at the results, you don't
see anything like that. There doesn't seem to be any relationship
whatsoever between medical discipline and measures of quality that were
used in this study.
Just to summarize, quality problems were too common in healthcare.
The dominant finding is that there are large gaps between the care people
should receive and the care they do receive. That [the gap] doesn't always
lead to death, [but] it can lead to less than optimal outcomes. It doesn't
matter whether you look at preventive, acute or chronic [care]. It doesn't
matter whether you look at overuse or underuse. It doesn't matter whether
you look at the type of health facility that's providing it. It doesn't matter
what your age range is and it doesn't matter where you look in the country.
This is a pretty chilling picture. Now, "why" is the next question. This
19.

IOM, supra note 6, at 1.
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is another element of the "through the looking glass" nature of this problem.
Each of these groups-lawyers, physicians, academics and patient safety
advocates-have different explanations for these problems. The lawyers
say it's because there is too much medical malpractice. The physicians say
it's because there is too much malpractice liability. The academics, as
Barry, I think, has very ably pointed out, say there is a lot of negligence and
injuries out there, but the liability system isn't doing a very good job in
response. The patient safety advocates, which have become an increasingly
great significance in the public's fear, have argued that it's really the
systems that are the problem and liability is not part of the solution because
it stifles error reporting and inhibits cooperation. Not surprisingly, there are
competing solutions, some of which we heard about this morning.
Lawyers argue for more aggressive tort litigation, elimination of peer
review privileges and public access to the National Practitioner Data Bank
(although it turns out nobody is reporting, so why bother?). Some
[p]hysicians have argued aggressively, and with some success in various
states, to cap damages and attorney's fees, have expert screening panels,
and some alternative dispute resolution.
In academics, the Harvard Medical Practice Team has been in love with
no fault enterprise liability and has argued for it over the last fifteen years.20
Originally they argued for it on the grounds that there was inadequate
compensation in the existing system. They have now repackaged it and
argue for it on the grounds [that] it will help deter medical error. It's a
response to the patient safety problem. Academics are also very keen on
voluntary error reporting.
The patient safety movement is interested in broadening the debate to
include not just errors that result in death, but near misses, focusing on
processes and encouraging voluntary reporting of problems by cutting back
on liability. Why isn't liability contributing much [to the crisis]? Well,
there is too much bad litigation. Bad in the sense of cases brought in where
there isn't negligence. That is, there is not enough litigation for where there
was actual negligence.
[T]here are seven times as many patients that are injured due to
negligence as file claims; the more severe the injury, the smaller that
number [that file claims] becomes. The number drops down to about one in
three with very severe injuries. It's important to recognize that the Harvard
Medical Practice Study treated as adverse errors everything from one

20.
HARVARD MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS:
MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK

(1990).
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additional night in the hospital to death. 21 That was the range they were
looking at. So, 7.6 includes a lot of things that aren't severe enough to
justify, in the patient's mind or their lawyer, bringing the claim. To the
extent it's an elderly or poor person that's injured and was sick already, the
incentives for private litigation go down because there isn't the prospect of
economic damages recovery.
Now, liability hasn't done a very good job [of stemming the medical
malpractice crisis]. In a paper that I have been working on with a coauthor, I argue that liability isn't going to do a very good job no matter how
you tweak it because the real problem is that the system of compensating
healthcare providers isn't tied to quality or outcome. A good doctor gets
paid the same as a bad doctor. There is no other sector in the economy
where compensation has no relationship to whether you are doing a good or
a bad job. In fact, in healthcare you can get paid more for doing a rotten job
under some circumstances, which is a very peculiar thought. There is no
system of compensation that makes agents better off for making principals
worse off that hangs around for very long.
The other problem is the cost and benefits of quality improved are
A healthcare provider that aggressively pursues quality
separated.
improvement incurs upfront costs for doing so, sometimes very substantial
costs, staggering costs for some of these measures. All of the benefits of
that accrue to the patients, but the provider's compensation is exactly the
same as somebody down the street who doesn't make those investments in
quality. There is no business case, or at least not a compelling business
case, for providers to invest in quality. If your patients had money-back
guarantees, that would change the dynamics. Nobody is calling for that, but
it's important to appreciate [that] compensating people in a way that's
completely unconnected to the quality of the services [provided] can lead to
perverse results.
The road forward, which again Barry has talked about very effectively, is
[that] everybody has their own pet solution which neatly dovetails with how
they diagnose the problem, and typically their self interest. The media
focuses on the malpractice insurance affordability crisis, and there is a real
crisis. There is a dramatic spike in the premiums that providers in certain
specialties and certain states are facing. It's important to recognize that and
to think about ways of dealing with it, but it's also important to recognize
this is a manifestation of a series of underlying causes. Consequently,
unless you want to be in the soup again in five to ten years, I think
refraining the debate to try and align the economic incentives more
effectively and to try and incorporate both malpractice and patient safety
21.

Id.
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strategies to address this is going to work better.
We are now seeing the first malpractice crisis of the twenty-first century.
It would be useful if we rethought how we went about it. One way of doing
it is to think about what we can learn from other industries. With regard to
worker's compensation, there is a cartoon with a county hospital and it has
a sign of the sort that any of you that have ever been in a factory will be
very familiar with. It says up at the top "172 days without an accident." I
submit to you if there was a billboard outside healthcare providers that
announced that [the number of days without an accident], you would start
making the business case for quality a lot different than the current
environment does. We are going to need to come up with other strategies.
Now [with] that said, we have [time] for questions.
DR. PARSI: I'm Kayhan Parsi with the Neiswanger Institute for
Bioethics and Health Policy at Loyola. I enjoyed both of your talks, but I
wanted to pick up on this issue that Professor Hyman mentioned about
academic solutions, and what you finished off, Professor Furrow, with
workman's compensation. There is a recent article in the Annals of Internal
Medicine by Troyen Brennan and Michelle Mello where they talked about
all the deficiencies of the current tort system and argued once again for a
no-fault system. I am just wondering why is that such [a good option]? I
understand all [of] the political reasons, but with all the deficiencies, we are
looking at a broken system. Why are we still trying to tweak the system
with all of these different things [instead of] trying to do something
completely different? I am curious what your thoughts are.
PROF. FURROW: Your question is why don't we move to some kind of
a no fault or enterprise liability system. I think David and I have both
written about the problems with these systems. It's a very nice idea to have
an integrated system that's responsible for paying for patient injury and
they can then police within the institution the error of generation points, the
doctors, nurses, or whatever it is.
The problem is, first of all, we have never really achieved integration in
our healthcare system. We still have a fragmented, scattered system.
[Neither] horizontal nor vertical integration has really happened. You saw
what happened in Clinton's Health Security Act-it died. It was an attempt
at some modest degree of integration. The second problem with these nofault systems is where a patient has an injury, even a small one, the hospital
says "we made a mistake, we are going to cover your care, bring your
22. Troyen A. Brennan & Michelle M. Mello, Patient Safety and Medical Malpractice:
A Case Study, 139 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 267, 271 (2003).
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lawyer in, and let's sit down and we will talk about giving you money."
This is the VA model. You don't ever have to go to court. You never have
to file suit. The system makes a tender. It works in the VA, for a variety of
reasons unique to the VA.
Well, what's the problem from a hospital or insurance company's point
of view? The universe of claims, now screened out by the tort system
because they are too small, is huge. I think hospitals always were afraid of
the consequences of opening up a system and paying everybody, even for
little things. Exposure is great, and I think insurers would have the same
problem. I don't know how you insure against a universe of claims that's
now vastly larger than the current system. The current system is great
because it filters out a lot of claims from an insurance point of view, even
though it has other problems.
The data [shows] two reasons why enterprise liability has never taken
off. There has been no lobby pushing it because insurers and hospitals are
anxious about it and we have never had the integration that would allow it
to happen. I mean, doctors are still on staff. They have these curious
arrangements where doctors run a hospital through the staff and the hospital
administration and the board have to fight to gain power over them in
contrast to more national systems like the British or the Italian, where
clearly they are integrated national health services. The British are still
struggling now with how to compensate for increased errors. It's a hard fix.
DR. HYMAN: Just very briefly. You can get there [an integrated
system] either voluntarily or by statute. Voluntarily is hard for the reasons
that Barry has outlined and I went through [the reasons] in an article in the
Texas Law Review a few years ago.23 The truth of the matter is you need a
pre-existing structure that maps well onto the sorts of things enterprise
liability is trying to accomplish. With the very limited exception of some
academic medical centers, there aren't really many institutions that have
that kind of arrangement where you need exclusive arrangements with a
controllable number of physicians to control the risk and capture the
benefits of doing it.
The related reason is that most people think it's a lot more expensive to
run an enterprise liability system. So, you are encouraging individuals to
voluntarily move to a system where they pay more. That's a very hard sell.
As Yogi Berra once said, "if people want to go to the ballpark, nobody is
going to stop them."
By statute it's very hard. The states that have attempted this have gotten
23.

David A. Hyman, Medical Malpracticeand the Tort System: What Do We Know and

What (IfAnything) Should We Do About It?, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1639, 1647-54 (2002).
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absolutely nowhere. The reason for that is reform of a particular type is
everybody's first preference and doing nothing is everybody's second
preference. The result is you get a legislative stalemate. You don't see it
being adopted by statute in individual states either, for all of these reasons.
Other questions?
MR. BRYANT: Ed Bryant, Gardner, Carton & Douglas, former adjunct
professor at the Institute for Health Law at Loyola. One of the solutions
raised by you, Professor Hyman, dealt with the issue of paying physicians
more for better results. I suspect that most people in the room who have
tried to see something like that work would conclude that what would really
happen is that the good ones would stay where they are right now and the
bad ones would get less. But the more important part of my question is
whether you have seen it? Both of you can comment on Professor
Dranoff's article about a year ago on the Maryland and New York
experiments in paying physicians more for better results, where he
concluded that what physicians did when they were paid more for better
results is they selected their patients more carefully and didn't give access
to the ones who needed it the most.
DR. HYMAN: I have seen the paper and it's actually a very interesting
paper. The system that was at stake didn't pay for performance. What it
did was disclose results for cardiac surgery. After a lot of econometrics, the
conclusion was that the result of making information available was a sorting
effect by healthcare providers. They shifted who they provided the services
to and they seemingly denied care to the sickest patients.
[I]t was a very interesting result. I have some questions about it. Let me
put it this way: any system of creating incentives [actually] creates the
incentive to sort. We think that's a good thing in many areas of the
economy. We think giving tort lawyers a share of their recovery
encourages them to select cases where there is the prospect of a recovery
and not to bring frivolous cases. We think that it makes sense for them to
spend their time on things where there will be beneficial feedback from
their effort rather than negative feedback.
The embedded assumption in the analysis of your question is that
everybody should get everything and somebody should pay for it. Again, in
healthcare most people view that with the utmost equanimity, except for
economists, who are shocked and appalled. As a recovering economist I
am still sort of shocked and appalled that thinking about whether the
benefits are not greater than the costs is not worth asking.
PROF. FURROW: I have two responses to that study. One is you [the
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol13/iss2/9
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provider] can try to adjust for your patient so that when you do your data
disclosure you can take into account the harder cases, when you pay for
harder cases [and this] prevent[s] the sorting or screening out patients who
you [the payor or patient or researcher] don't want screened out.
The second observation is that in New York, which has been disclosing
cardiac mortality rates for a long time, the effect on the institutions has been
interesting because they have scrambled when they ranked poorly to look at
why, to sort it out, to get rid of providers, to improve their procedures so
that they could rise up in the institution wide rankings. So it clearly has had
a positive effect on cardiac care in New York on an institution-byinstitution basis, according to the studies I have read. It's certainly not a bad
thing to have public data available as to how you do, [but] understanding it
does have these problems you described.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I would like to ask about a parallel crisisthe shortage in nursing-which I think might have an impact on the angry
patient who is no longer getting the kind of individualized care he or she
expected. I [also] think it might increase the number of errors that occur
during the patient's care. I'm wondering if you see that as an important
aspect of the malpractice crisis?
PROF. FURROW: I think there has been some evidence recently that
nursing staffing levels directly correlate to increased levels of patient injury.
The question is how does the system respond to it. I can tell you that in
Pennsylvania, Delaware, and New Jersey nurses are now being paid at the
level of, for a registered nurse, $80,000 to $90,000 a year. Hospitals are
scrambling to recruit. Of course the consequence is it shortens the budget
in other areas and it's an issue for all institutions that have a budget to
balance. Clearly the market has responded here and more nurses are in
place, staffing levels have improved, at least in my part of the country.
Clearly nurses are very important. They are a major part.
There is a series of studies by a Harvard sociologist about teams within
hospitals. Hospitals are a box. Within it you have teams that operate more
or less effectively. There are also studies that look at the operation of a
surgeon, for example, at cross hospitals where he or she has privileges.
You find that the mortality rate and efficacy of the surgeon varies across
teams, even within the same hospital, which tells you something about the
system, the nursing system, the integration in the delivery of healthcare,
something that hasn't been studied enough, but is really part of the puzzle
in error reduction.
DR. HYMAN: Other questions?
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MR. SCHNEIDER: I'm Mark Schneider. I am with Loyola University's
Stritch School of Medicine: I have a basic problem with the interplay of
quality and malpractice. I think there are two separate systems going on
here. The funding, the decision-making, the analysis that goes into mega
millions of dollars that affects malpractice is almost divorced from quality.
It's an accident that there are quality issues related to that. So, I think there
are really two separate strings and to tie them together and think we are
going to fix the malpractice problem by fixing quality is a misnomer. I
would appreciate your view on that.
PROF. FURROW: I don't disagree with you. I think hospital risk
management has very little to do historically with quality management. It
has to do with managing risks from slip and falls to surgical mishaps to
drug errors. I think you are right.
It seems to me that the patient safety movement has been pushing to
better integrate two parallel universes, [which] is not easy to do. I don't
have an easy answer to that. I think you have to wait for the next articles
David and I write to see the answer.
DR. HYMAN: Again, I agree. I think they [quality and malpractice
insurance rates] have been divorced. The question that's been on the table,
particularly by the patient safety advocates, is if you remove the threat of
liability with all of the problems that there are with liability, do you
somehow miraculously expect the quality to be free from the threat of
liability, to emerge and trample over all the existing institutional problems
that have prevented the systematic delivery of high quality care? I think on
that question, the available evidence really isn't there and liability, at least
my bottoni line is, it's not perfect, but getting rid of it probably makes
things worse rather than making things better. Even if you don't believe
that, the politics of getting rid of it are going to make it very hard to do.
There was another question?
PROF. FURROW: Let me make a comment on the last question. It
seems to me David is right. Patricia Danson, now at the University of
Pennsylvania, long ago wrote in a book on medical malpractice that she
thought the system was worth keeping, if you could look at, say, a ten
percent reduction in the error rate that the malpractice system is responsible
for.24 It's very hard to point your finger at that and say it works.
24. PATRICIA
225-27 (1985).
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On the other hand, I certainly know that providers pay attention to the
risk that their exposure to malpractice brings. I was talking to the general
counsel at Cooper Health System in Camden, New Jersey. They just hired
the Harvard Risk Management Group to come in and remake their whole
risk management operation with a real quality focus. I think that's probably
as good a group as there is to try to integrate and improve their insurance
payouts, at the same time reducing their patient risk. It's hard to integrate,
but I think doing away with the system is no panacea.
MR. GOLDSTEIN: My name is Neal Goldstein. I'm a partner with
Much, Shelist in Chicago and I represent a fair amount of physicians. I
don't have the benefit of the statistical analysis that you in the academic
world have, so I have to go on the anecdotal, but I see a lot of anecdotes. I
think that in dealing with physicians and their personalities, they don't
really need to be incentivized to provide quality care [because] it's almost
their nature [to do so.]. If you look at their backgrounds and where they
were in school, and the fact that they went into medical school, residency
and fellowship, these are people who are very much incentivized and
motivated to provide the greatest quality.
I think from my experience, and I would like your comment on it, the
real problem isn't the self-policing. [The real problem is] that physicians,
at the same time they are quality-oriented, also walk around with the
attitude of "there are but for the grace of God go I," so therefore if I am
going to point out a problem with Dr. X, my colleague, he therefore could
do the same with me. I would like to hear your comments on whether there
is validity to really pursuing the self-policing more aggressively.
PROF. FURROW: That's part of what I referred to in improving medical
discipline. I think it depends on what you are talking about-what kind of
physician group and what kind of practice. Are errors detected? Are they
disclosed? Is the hospital trying to manage them? What happens?
There are some wonderful cases, or horrible cases, of doctors who
operate on patients who are clearly not candidates for surgery and they die.
Why didn't the hospital have some kind of pre-approval process for surgery
in certain situations? Hospitals are very poor controllers and that is part of
the problem. I would start with that rather than this kind of soft policing
approach, it seems to me.
I have great sympathy for the ethic, the professional ethic, the drive for
excellence. I think it's a question of over time-how institutions detect the
tiring doctor, the depressed doctor, and the problem doctor whose quality is
slipping? Is that detectible? Is data available? Is it being monitored? Is
anything being done?
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Clearly we all, as we age, lose things and we need to stay sharp and
somebody needs to be paying attention to us. Professional ethics doesn't do
it. Internal motivation doesn't do it all by itself.
DR. HYMAN: [O]ne last question.
MR. BROWN: Max Brown, general counsel at Rush University Medical
Center. I appreciated both of your comments, but I would like to have you
address the issue of high attachment points. Many of the academic medical
centers in Chicago have attachment points that are at $15 million. Rush
currently has a $15 million attachment point for each and every occurrence
that takes place.
Barry, when you talk about the insurance premiums and the difficulty, if
we could find the insurance companies first, that would be great, but as you
know St. Paul has left the market. What has been your experience in terms
of a venue like Cook County where major medical centers have such high
attachment points? Actuarially, how long can that system continue?
PROF. FURROW: I don't know the answer to that. The studies haven't
looked at, or intend to look at, lines of insurance sold to individual doctors
since academic medical centers are more self-insured than by surplus lines.
This is a problem in Pennsylvania, quite clearly. I think in the Cooper
[Health System, Camden, New Jersey] situation they are much higher than
that for their attachment point. That's why they brought in the Harvard
group. They don't want to make any more mistakes. They can't afford it.
They are setting aside too much in reserves. It [attachment points] hasn't
been studied very well. The situation you are talking about is a problem
that the investment cycle may not cure from your point of view. I don't
have a solution for you.
MS. KURTZ: I'm state representative Rosemary Kurtz. I am on the
Healthcare Availability & Access Committee. There are three other
representatives here, Julie Hamos, Eileen Lyons, and Patricia Bellock, that
are on this committee. However, my question is federal. The Senate is
trying to put together a federal law and it seems that tort reform is the
problem.2 5 The authors or the sponsors are Senator Frisk, the majority
leader, and Senator Dianne Feinstein, so it's truly bipartisan. I would like
you to comment on what you think of the bill that they are trying to put
25. Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act, H.R. 5,
108th Cong. (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov. The legislation was placed on the
Senate Legislative Calendar on Mar. 21, 2003.
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together because I understand they have reached a stymie on the tort
reform.
DR. HYMAN: The bill reflects a fairly traditional cap driven approach to
the problem, which if your sole focus is to decrease the amount of payouts
and make insurance more affordable, the evidence, if from California and
not from Indiana, suggests that will work. The evidence from Indiana
suggests that this provides a baseline target for negotiation and you could
see some creep. If you don't index it, it erodes in value over time.
The other problem with caps is that they are heavily regressive; that is
the people who are most heavily injured are the ones who are paying the
price of the caps. If you are not severely injured and your recovery is going
to be under the cap anyway, it makes no difference.
I don't think much of it [caps] for the same reason I don't think much of
price controls. I don't view it as addressing the root of the problem. It
addresses a symptom, and probably the wrong symptom, and if I took
nothing else away from medical school, it was direct diagnosis is necessary
before you prescribe treatment. I don't view it as the correct diagnosis.
The final point is [that] there is a huge divide between physicians and
plaintiffs on causes of malpractice and the nature of the problem, but that's
not nearly as big as the divide between academics and the rest of the world
on the malpractice problem.
I think Barry and I have given you a fairly standard picture of what the
empirical evidence is on the tort system and it simply doesn't match up with
a response that says caps will solve everything and a new day will dawn.
PROF. FURROW: There is an excellent report by the Missouri
26 They have caps
Commissioner of Insurance that looks at their system.
adjusted for inflation. His proposal is that they should do a much better job
of regulating insureds in Missouri if they want to smooth out malpractice
prices.
I think federalizing this with something as simple-minded as caps is a
poor idea and it's simply not going to happen. We have been through this.
I have bills in my filing cabinet that go back to 1974 and they all look alike.
They were more sophisticated in 1974, actually, because they had more
academic origins. Now it's just caps and whittling back on the plaintiffs
right to sue through mechanisms that affect the tort system and filings and
so on.
These are reforms that are too little too late and miss the real point. If
26. Mo. Dep't of Ins., Medical Malpractice Insurance in Missouri: The Current
Difficulties in Perspective (Feb. 2003), at http://www.citizen.org.
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anything, I would strengthen the federal initiatives in promoting medical
error disclosure, attaching penalties, and driving institutions in particular
toward real patient safety.
DR. HYMAN: I think that's all the time we have. Thank you.
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